










By David G. Lewis 
 
Introduction 
One of Russia’s most significant instruments in its strategic toolbox has been its capacity to use 
diplomacy to pursue its geopolitical opportunities in regional conflicts. From Nagorno-Karabakh 
to Libya, from Syria to Afghanistan, Russia’s diplomats are at the top table at peace negotiations. 
Russia is increasingly the key pivot power in any conflict resolution process in the Middle East. 
Russia’s approach to conflict management is a form of coercive diplomacy: a strategic mixing of 
hard power and diplomatic know-how. It has often been highly effective in managing conflicts in 
ways that respect and promote Russia’s national interests.  
Russia’s emerging role as a diplomatic broker and mediator in international conflicts 
supports several of Russia’s strategic goals. First, it addresses Russia’s search for international 
status, providing ways for Russian diplomats to be in the room when major international security 
issues are discussed. Second, it corresponds to Russia’s self-conception of how a Great Power 
(and UN Security Council member) should act; in Moscow’s realist worldview, Great Powers 
have additional rights, but also take on additional responsibilities for peace and security, 
particularly in their sphere of influence.  
Of more immediate significance is the way in which Russia’s conflict diplomacy is 
designed to directly benefit Russia’s foreign policy goals. It has so far proved an effective and 
low-cost mechanism to consolidate or extend Russian geopolitical influence as in Syria or in 
Eastern Libya, where it acts as a multiplier for the deployment of military force and helps to 
legitimize a Russian military presence. Furthermore, it provides Russia with leverage in its 
relations with other regional powers; for example, Russia’s diplomatic and military engagement 
in regional conflicts offers a mechanism for Russia to maintain an edge in bilateral relations with 
Turkey.  
Finally, acting as a mediator and peacemaker in conflicts offers a relatively low-risk way 
to compete with the West; Russia’s actions have reduced Western influence in Syria, the 
Southern Caucasus, Libya, and central Africa. At the same time, because Russia has positioned 
itself as an indispensable actor in many of these conflicts, the U.S. and its European allies are 
forced to maintain effective channels of communication with Russia to help manage regional 
conflicts.  
 
Russia and Post-Soviet Peacekeeping 
Russia’s current approach to peacebuilding and armed conflict reflects a long evolution of 
Russian thinking on peace and conflict in the post-Cold War world. By 1993, Russia had some 
36,000 troops deployed on peacekeeping duties in post-Soviet conflicts in Tajikistan, 
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Transnistria, and Abkhazia.1 But Russian peacekeeping had no clear doctrine and policies often 
evolved as the result of ad hoc attempts by local commanders to respond to events on the ground. 
Russia’s peacekeeping deployments certainly aimed to stem the violence in these post-Soviet 
wars, but they also reflected Russian geopolitical goals rather than playing a classical impartial 
peacekeeping role.2 In the 1990s, Russia’s actions seldom generated serious tensions with the 
West: the EU and the U.S. were happy to delegate the management of messy post-Soviet 
conflicts to the Russians, even if it was often clear that Russia was acting both as participant and 
peacemaker in a string of conflict zones. However, tensions with the West began to appear more 
frequently during Moscow’s botched counterinsurgency in Chechnya in 1994-96. The conflict in 
Serbia over Kosovo caused a more significant rupture with NATO in 1999.  
During the 2000s, Russia’s approach to conflict management began to diverge more 
significantly from dominant Western approaches. First, Russia rejected the vision of 
humanitarian intervention inspired by the Balkan wars—the Blair doctrine—that legitimized the 
use of force without UN approval in cases of mass human rights abuses. After the high point of 
liberal international order marked by the UN World Summit in 2005, Russia began to contest 
ideas such as the responsibility to protect (R2P) norm much more strongly.3 In January 2007, in 
an historic vote that symbolized the end of the post-Cold War illusion of a consensual liberal 
order, Russia and China vetoed a UN resolution condemning human rights abuses in Zimbabwe, 
marking the first use of multiple vetoes since 1989 and the first time that Russia and China had 
united to veto a resolution since 1972. Russia was no longer prepared to accept that internal 
affairs were a legitimate subject to discuss under the rubric of international peace and security. 
Russia’s view of peace enforcement emphasized the importance of the sovereign state, not as an 
abstract norm, but as a form of political resistance to what Russia viewed as an unacceptable 
expansion of U.S. influence and power.  
Second, Russia increasingly came to reject “liberal” approaches to conflict resolution that 
viewed pluralism as an essential component of a sustainable peace. Typically, international 
conflict resolution efforts sought to end conflicts by finding a solution acceptable to all warring 
parties through peace talks. Peace processes in the 1990s in the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and 
South Africa all followed such a model, which assumed that peace could emerge from carefully 
mediated talks among different political factions, in which armed actors would compromise to 
achieve peace. This approach, sometimes known as “liberal peacebuilding,” relied on peace talks 
often overseen by small western states such as Norway, who were assumed to be neutral actors.  
Such initiatives were often accompanied by an influx of international organizations and 
civil society into conflict zones aiming to address both the immediate consequences of conflict 
and the underlying root causes. Nevertheless, liberal peacebuilding had a mixed record, often 
failing to resolve conflicts and arguably exacerbating others. As part of a wider backlash against 
liberalism, an alternative model of “illiberal” or “authoritarian” conflict management has made a 
comeback. Military force is central to imposing order in this model, but it cannot be deployed  
                                                 
1 Bettina Renz, “Russian responses to the changing character of war,” International Affairs 95: 4 (2019): 817–834 
[p. 820]; https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz100. 
2 Dov Lynch, “Peacekeeping and Coercive Diplomacy: Russian Suasion,” Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the 
CIS (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 19-36. 
3 Derek Averre and Lance Davies, “Russia, humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: the case of 
Syria,” International Affairs 91.4 (2015): 813-834. 
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alone. Achieving an end to the conflict also requires coercive forms of diplomatic negotiation to 
co-opt parties, to divide the opposition, and to provide some legitimacy to counterinsurgency 
operations.4 
This pushback against liberal ideas about peace and conflict at the international level 
largely reflected Russia’s own experience of war in Chechnya. The first Chechen war in 1994-96 
had been a disastrous failure for Moscow. It was a brutal counterinsurgency that forever tainted 
the Yeltsin presidency with its mass violations of human rights by Russian troops. From 
Moscow’s point of view, it was also an abject failure, ending with a humiliating capitulation to 
Chechen rebels at the Khasavyurt Accords in 1996. The rise of Vladimir Putin was accompanied 
by calls for no more “Khasavyurts,” and the Second Chechen War was run with a different set of 
rules. Gone were the critical Western journalists and shocking television pictures; the OSCE and 
Western “mediators” were no longer welcome. This was a war fought inside sovereign 
boundaries where Russia brooked no external criticism.5  
The Chechen war had significant influence on Russian thinking about peace and conflict. 
From now on, Russia would follow a new set of rules: striving for control over the information 
environment; using local proxies rather than Russian forces; excluding international actors and 
mediators; and channeling funds to loyal allies as a means of political and social control. These 
lessons of the Chechen conflict inevitably influenced Russian thinking about how to manage 
armed conflicts as the scope of Russian interests widened into the Middle East, the Eastern 
Mediterranean, and Africa. As Russia became involved in a wider range of conflicts, it refined its 
normative framework for peace and conflict and adjusted its diplomatic and military toolbox to 
match. While it was primarily Russia’s deployment of its military forces (or Russian-tasked 
auxiliary forces) in conflicts such as Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, and Libya that attracted the most 
attention, less attention was paid to Russia’s emerging doctrine of peace enforcement, which 
mixed diplomatic, political, informational, and military tools into an increasingly effective 
package.  
 
Russian Peacemaking as a Global Idea 
By the late 2010s, Russian officials were no longer just criticizing the shortcomings of Western 
military interventions, although the difficulties faced by the U.S. and its allies in Afghanistan, 
Libya, and Iraq certainly galvanized Russian diplomacy. Russia also began to promote Russian 
mediation and conflict management as a positive alternative to Western interventions. An 
influential Russian think tank report argued that Russia needed to develop new ideas for its 
foreign policy, the first of which should be for Russia to promote its role as “an effective and 
successful peacemaker.” The authors argued, “Russia should give more importance to 
peacemaking and the settlement of military conflicts in its foreign policy rhetoric.”6 This role as 
a peacemaker was formalized in the constitutional amendments adopted in 2020. Among the 
changes that allowed Vladimir Putin to extend his term as president almost indefinitely, a little-
noticed amendment to Article 79 mandates Russia to “support and strengthen international peace 
and security,” while “not permitting interference in the internal affairs of states.” 
                                                 
4 David Lewis, John Heathershaw, and Nick Megoran, “Illiberal Peace? Authoritarian Modes of Conflict 
Management,” Cooperation and Conflict 53.4 (2018): 486–506, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836718765902. 
5 John Russell, “Ramzan Kadyrov’s illiberal peace in Chechnya,” in Anne Le Huérou, Aude Merlin, Amandine 
Regamey, and Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski, Chechnya at war and beyond (London: Routledge, 2014): 133-151. 
6 Sergei A. Karaganov and Dmitry V. Suslov, “Russia in the Post-Coronavirus World: New Ideas for Foreign 
Policy,” Russia in Global Affairs, May 17, 2020, https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/post-coronavirus-world/. 
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Alongside this discursive shift, since 2015 Russia has actively intervened militarily and 
diplomatically in a series of conflicts outside the post-Soviet space. In Syria, Russia not only 
provided air support for Syria’s brutal counterinsurgency campaign, but also negotiated truces 
with local rebels and initiated a national process that attempted to persuade rebels to agree to a 
political settlement.7 In pursuit of a political agreement, Russia initiated the Astana process in 
2017, a series of meetings of Russia, Turkey, and Iran.8  
In Libya, Russia used the private military company Wagner to provide military backing 
for General Khalifa Haftar in 2019-20, and leveraged its position on the ground to emerge as a 
key player in peace talks. In Afghanistan, official promoted peace talks in the so-called Moscow 
Format, which combined regional powers in talks among Afghan powerbrokers, after it had 
begun engaging more closely with the Taliban and other armed factions. In the Central African 
Republic (CAR), Russian officials and security contractors negotiated truces with rebel warlords 
in 2018 and attempted to negotiate a peace agreement at the national level, often working in 
competition with an alternative United Nations (UN) initiative. Finally, in November 2020, a 
Russian peacekeeping force was deployed as part of a deal negotiated by Moscow to stop the 
fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh.  
Even where Russia has no military forces, it has also offered its services as a diplomatic 
mediator. In the Middle East, alongside Libya and Syria, Russia has also offered its services to 
mediate in the civil war in Yemen9 and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In 2019, Russia 
advanced a Gulf Collective Security proposal, offering a regional peace proposal to complement 
Russia’s national level initiatives.10 None of these initiatives have produced any significant 
results, but they demonstrate Russia’s willingness to play a wider political and diplomatic role in 
the region. Russia has also been active in South Asia offering to mediate to reduce tensions 
between India and Pakistan in 2019.11 Russia inserted itself into the diplomacy of the Afghan 
conflict, hosting a Troika-Plus mechanism (United States, Russia, China + Pakistan) as a 
diplomatic platform to discuss the conflict.12  
Although each of these situations differed—and Russia’s initiatives did not always gain 
traction—some contours of a new Russian peacemaking model began to emerge. Russia lacked 
the economic and military power to replace the U.S. as a regional power or to challenge the 
rising influence of China, but it began to carve out an influential role as a security broker, a pivot 
power around which regional powers began to coalesce. Russia deployed hard force where 
necessary, but in selective and cautious ways, and always augmented it with active, multi-
                                                 
7 Marika Sosnowski, “Ceasefires as Violent State-Building: Local Truce and Reconciliation Agreements in the 
Syrian Civil War,” Conflict, Security and Development 20, no. 2, (2019): 1–20, 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2019.1679561. 
8 On the Astana process, see Sergey V. Kostelyanets, “Russia’s Peace Initiatives in the MENA Region: Evaluation 
and Prospects,” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 13.4 (2019): 534-555; Samer Abboud, 
“Making peace to sustain war: the Astana Process and Syria’s illiberal peace,” Peacebuilding (2021): 1-18, 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21647259.2021.1895609. 
9 S. Ramani, “Can Russia play a role in ending the Yemeni civil war?” Middle East Institute, August 12, 2019, 
https://www.mei.edu/publications/can-russia-play-role-ending-yemeni-civil-war. 
10 Marianna Belenkaya, “Ot Livii do ubiystva Suleymani. Chto oznachayet dlya Rossii novaya nestabil’nost’ na 
Blizhnem Vostoke,” Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2020, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/80698. 
11“Russia offers to help mediate between India and Pakistan,” Reuters, February 28, 2019, https://www.reuters. 
com/article/us-india-kashmir-russia/russia-offers-to-help-mediate-between-india-and-pakistan-idUSKCN1QH1EI.  
12 David G. Lewis, “Return to Kabul? Russian Policy in Afghanistan,” Security Insights, George C. Marshall 




channel diplomacy, business deals, niche economic offers, security assistance and arms sales, 
and personalized networks of relationships that enabled quick responses and flexible decision-
making. Much of Russia’s approach was trial and error; often things did not work out as planned, 
but the costs were low and risks manageable. It was certainly not a fully-fledged philosophy of 
post-liberal peacebuilding. Nevertheless, some key principles emerged that characterize a 
specifically Russian model of conflict management, or—as I have termed it elsewhere—of 
coercive mediation.  
 
Ten Principles of Russian Conflict Management 
Russia’s approach to conflict management can best be described as a form of coercive 
diplomacy: a combination of peace talks with power politics. It is important to recognize that this 
is not a coherent blueprint or model. Unlike many Western liberal approaches, it is highly 
context-specific; policies are based on a study of the correlation of forces in a conflict and on the 
local and regional power dynamics in each case. But there are some consistent elements that 
underpin Russia’s approach. Here I outline a set of underlying principles that can be identified as 
characteristic of the Russian approach to conflict management.  
 
1. The goal is to stop the fighting, not to transform societies.  
Russia is not concerned about achieving social transformation or democratization, but instead 
about introducing a minimum of political order, in line with Russia’s geopolitical interests. 
Indeed, an important underlying philosophical position is Russia’s rejection of universal values 
in favor of particularistic cultures and civilizational divides. In Afghanistan, for example, 
Western policy-makers often reference the importance of women’s rights and the “democratic 
gains” of the past two decades as important elements of any political settlement. Russia’s hyper-
realist approach largely leaves such normative elements on one side, instead assuming 
Afghanistan is a highly conservative society that is not ready for Western liberal values. This 
indifference to a “values agenda” means Russia is happy to support a wide range of partners with 
different ideologies, from the Taliban to General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan rebels, just as long as 
they are capable of imposing order and protecting Russia’s interests. 
 
2. The only guarantee of stability is a strong state.  
Liberal approaches to conflict resolution often view the state as part of the problem and 
encourage civil society and non-state actors to play a leading role. Russia took a different path, 
arguing that a strong state is a precondition for peace. Democratization and elections, on the 
other hand, are often destabilizing; much better is an authoritarian strongman who can keep order 
than a pluralist polity that allows terrorist and militant groups to flourish.  
This tenet reflects Russia’s own approach to domestic political order, where the central 
need for a strong state has been a leitmotif of Putinist thinking since the late 1990s. Even in 1999 
Putin was proclaiming, “Russia needs strong state power [vlast’] and must have it,” and talked of 
the strong state as “the source and guarantor of order, the initiator and driving force of any 
change.”13 In the international context, the same principle applies, not only as an ideological 
stance that mirrors Russia’s domestic priorities, but as a reaction against what Russian officials  
                                                 
13 David G. Lewis, Russia's New Authoritarianism: Putin and the Politics of Order (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2020), 7-8. 
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often see as the destabilizing effect of Western support for anti-government movements and 
rebellions. In the context of the Middle East, for example, Sergei Karaganov, an influential 
Russian academic, argues “any weakening of statehood, especially in such a vulnerable region, is 
a proven evil.”14  
Hence, the first step to stability is through strengthening a friendly state government; 
Russia’s backing for Assad, Maduro, Lukashenka, and the Myanmar junta all fit this pattern. But 
there are important exceptions in practice. Russia has backed a rebel group in Libya that seeks to 
overthrow the UN-recognized government, while in Afghanistan Russian officials often appear 
to have better relations with the Taliban than with the elected president, Ashraf Ghani. Russian 
officials have dismissed the Ukrainian government as a neo-Nazi junta and provided military 
support to separatist groups. This apparently contradictory position is justified by Russia’s 
dismissal of Western-backed governments as little more than “puppet” administrations, which it 
views as an obstacle to the establishment of a stronger, more effective sovereign state.  
 
3. Powerful, engaged states are better mediators than weak, neutral states.  
Classic conflict resolution approaches often recommend a neutral arbiter or mediator to oversee 
peace talks. Typically, this has been a small state, such as Norway, a UN special envoy, or a non-
governmental body such as the Crisis Management Initiative, a Finnish international non-profit 
organization. Russia tends to avoid these approaches, arguing that resolving conflicts is not best 
done through “horizontal” peace talks mediated by a neutral party (e.g. Norway), but by strong 
actors imposing their will on warring parties to achieve a cessation of violence (e.g. Russia or 
Turkey). In the case of Afghanistan, Russia opposed a widening of the peace process to include 
numerous states from outside the region. Instead it promoted a narrow Troika-Plus format of 
major powers (the United States, Russia, China plus Pakistan), which even excluded its 
traditional ally India. In Libya, Russia tried to achieve bilateral deals with Turkey while aligning 
with the UAE and Egypt. In Syria, Russia initiated the Astana process, under which Russia, 
Turkey, and Iran met regularly as guarantors of a political process. In each case, the entrance 
ticket to the diplomatic club is the power to influence armed groups on the ground.  
 
4. Peace talks are for powerbrokers.  
This focus on power politics as central to the international diplomacy of peacemaking is mirrored 
in Russia’s approach to peace talks. Liberal peacebuilding approaches have often tried an 
inclusive, participatory approach, bringing different social groups into the negotiating room. 
Western approaches to talks in Afghanistan, for example, have tried to include representatives of 
civil society and media and have also tried to improve the representation of women. In a series of 
Russian-sponsored intra-Afghan talks in 2019, dubbed the Moscow Format talks, Russia invited 
an exclusive group of powerbrokers and warlords along with the Taliban to discuss a political 
settlement.15 Russia’s approach views peace talks through a realpolitik lens; those with guns and 
political power have the ability to start and stop the violence, so it makes sense to limit the 
process to powerful armed factions and political leaders. This can be effective for short-term deal 
making, but an exclusively political settlement risks being unsustainable if it involves new 
patterns of repression that spark new rounds of violence.  
                                                 
14 Sergei Karaganov, “Год побед. Что дальше?” [A Year of Victories. What's Next?], Россия в глобальной 
политике, January 16, 2007.  
15 See Ekaterina Stepanova, “Russia and the Search for a Negotiated Solution in Afghanistan,” Europe-Asia Studies, 




5. Military activities and peace talks are closely inter-related.  
The line between war and peace is completely blurred; peace talks are a continuation of war by 
other means. Russian thinking stresses that there can be no outright military victory without 
accompanying negotiations, diplomacy, and information campaigns. Russia’s understanding of 
the importance of politics and diplomacy in war fighting is an integral part of Russian military 
doctrine, which argues for a central role for non-kinetic elements in any campaign. Article 36 of 
Russia’s 2015 National Security Strategy promises, “interrelated political, military, military-
technical, diplomatic, economic, informational, and other measures are being developed and 
implemented in order to ensure strategic deterrence and the prevention of armed conflicts.”16 An 
editorial in the Russian military journal, Voennaya Mysl’ [Military Thought], points to a growing 
belief that “to fight on the battlefield is the work of those who fail at politics and strategy.” Much 
better to achieve strategic goals through such non-military means as smart diplomacy, covert 
actions, political machinations, and information warfare.17 As with coercive diplomacy more 
generally, it is the ability to align developments in the negotiation room with activities on the 
battlefield that produces results; Russia has been particularly effective at linking its use of hard 
power with diplomatic initiatives.  
 
6. Effective peace-making requires information control.  
The first Chechen war taught Moscow that information campaigns and media activity are an 
essential part of conflict management. Consequently, in conflict diplomacy the Russian military 
and Russian diplomats view themselves as also fighting in an information war. Russia used 
extensive propaganda during the Ukraine conflict in 2014, including social media campaigns run 
from troll factories such as the Internet Research Agency (IRA). This also became a pattern 
during the Syrian conflict, where Russian disinformation campaigns aimed to mute international 
criticism of the Syrian counterinsurgency, including the use of chemical weapons. In the Central 
African Republic (CAR), where Russia has also mixed military assistance and peace talks with 
rebels, Russian contractors set up media operations, both old-fashioned radio programming and 
new social media campaigns, to support the Russian presence in the country. In Nagorno-
Karabakh, one of the first initiatives of the Russian peacekeeping operation was to set up a media 
unit. Since the deployment of Russian peacekeepers to the contested zone in November 2020, 
Russia has been able to monopolize information coming out of the peacekeeping zone.  
 
7. The end justifies the means.  
Unscrupulous methods are acceptable to achieve stability. Russia is willing to use a wide palette 
of methods to produce a form of political stability that respects Russia’s interests, including 
promises of business deals, coercion, and the use of violence, manipulation of humanitarian or 
development aid, or other violations of international humanitarian law. This principle is most 
evident in Russia’s backing of any means to suppress popular uprisings or insurgencies, 
including turning a blind eye to mass human rights abuses or even, in the case of Syria, the use 
of chemical weapons. The willingness to overlook injustice and human rights violations in the 
                                                 
16 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, 
December 31, 2015, http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-
Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf. 
17 “Strategiya i kontrstrategiya gibridnoi voiny” [Strategy and Counterstrategy of Hybrid War], Voennaya Mysl’ 
[Military Thought], October 10, 2018, http://vm.milportal.ru/strategiya-i-kontrstrategiya-gibridnoj-vojny/. 
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name of stabilization can also be traced to Russia’s experience in Chechnya but it is also 
reflected in Russia’s wider unwillingness to criticize other states’ conduct in suppressing 
rebellions or civil unrest. Such an approach may produce short-term stabilization, but it 
undermines any possibility of a just peace emerging. At best, Russian intervention produces an 
illiberal or authoritarian “peace,” i.e, a cessation of armed violence, but too often at the cost of 
human security and social justice. 
 
8. Humanitarian and development aid is a political tool. 
Russia has used humanitarian and development aid as a strategic tool to enhance its conflict 
management mechanisms. This has been most extensively trialed during Russia’s intervention in 
in Syria, where it has attempted to reduce cross-border UN aid flows to rebel-held areas while 
reinforcing its own and the Syrian government control of humanitarian assistance. In a series of 
showdowns at the UN Security Council in 2020, Russia forced the closure of several cross-
border aid routes from Turkey, leaving just the Bab al-Hawa Border Crossing open to provide 
aid to millions of civilians. Russia has been developing its own aid network inside Syria, 
managed by the Russian military’s Centre for Reconciliation of Conflicting Sides in Syria 
(CRCSS), but recent analysis suggests that Russia’s distribution of aid has aimed primarily “to 
buy loyalty and showcase its soft power.”18 Alongside the CRCSS, at least twenty-five other 
Russian entities, mostly religious organizations or state-linked NGOs, are also active, creating “a 
shadow aid system” that is part of Russia’s wider mechanism of conflict management.19 In 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia has replicated aspects of this model, setting up an Interagency 
Humanitarian Reaction Centre to manage humanitarian aid, refugees’ returns, and reconstruction 
tasks.20  
 
9. All conflicts have a regional dimension.  
In Russian diplomacy, a starting point for any conflict resolution process is a regional consensus 
on a way forward. Regional powers are often involved in internal conflicts through proxies, 
therefore effective conflict management needs a multi-level approach, in which consensus 
among regional powers precedes a political agreement on the ground. For more sustainable 
political breakthroughs, Russia also seeks legitimation through the UN. This stance is an 
important corrective to many western approaches to conflict, which have tended to ignore 
complex regional and international politics and instead have focused primarily on internal 
dynamics. But the Russian emphasis on regional geopolitics often risks oversimplifying the 
internal dynamics of conflicts: at times Russia’s attempts to achieve deals with other regional 
powers, notably Turkey, in the Libyan conflict foundered because they did not take sufficient 
account of the complex internal dynamics of the conflict. Assuming that proxies can be easily 
managed by regional powers risks overlooking the real political struggle on the ground that does 
not always map easily onto regional geopolitics.  
 
                                                 
18 Marika Sosnowski and Jonathan Robinson, “Mapping Russia’s soft power efforts in Syria through humanitarian 
aid,” Atlantic Council, June 25, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/mapping-russias-soft-
power-efforts-in-syria-through-humanitarian-aid/. 
19 Jonathan Robinson, “Russian aid in Syria: An underestimated instrument of soft power,” Atlantic Council, 
December 14, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/russian-aid-in-syria-an-underestimated-
instrument-of-soft-power/.  




10. The West is part of the problem, not part of the solution. 
Moscow argues that the intervention of Western powers is one of the primary causes of conflict 
in the Middle East and elsewhere. It is not only that interventions by the U.S. in Iraq or 
Afghanistan are viewed as failures, but that conflicts are the direct result—and even the 
deliberate aim—of U.S. foreign policy. In his famous Munich speech in 2007, Putin criticized 
“an almost uncontained hyper use of force . . . in international relations,” which was “plunging 
the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts.” This American-led unipolar order was creating a 
disorderly world, one in which “nobody feels safe.”21 United States foreign policy is widely 
characterized by Russian commentators as a strategy of “managed chaos” (upravlyaemyi khaos), 
marked by “color revolutions,” military interventions, and covert support for anti-government 
rebellions.22 Consequently, for Russia, regional powers, not western states, are the most effective 
powers to resolving conflicts. However, since the U.S. is also present in many conflicts, most 
cases also provide Russia with an opportunity to challenge and potentially supplant the U.S. and 
its allies.   
 
Conclusion: Challenges and New Problems 
Russia has ambitions to be a major security actor globally. Alongside its ability to project 
military power outside its immediate region, Russia also has extensive experience and capacity 
in conflict-related diplomacy. Russia has good intelligence and analysis capabilities and an 
effective diplomatic service that enables it to take on complex negotiations. The Russian model 
is effective at linking military, diplomatic, and economic instruments into a relatively successful 
policy mix.  
Some aspects of Russia's approach may be a useful challenge to gaps in contemporary 
international peacebuilding. At times, however, a focus on Great Power rivalries oversimplifies 
conflicts and overlooks complex local dynamics that can derail international initiatives. In 
addition, a highly exclusionary political process that ignores the interests of minorities and other 
social groups risks creating new conflict fault lines. But the biggest problem in Russian 
approaches to conflict is the outcome: an illiberal peace or an authoritarian strongman may be 
better than all-out civil war, but a failure to address issues of injustice and human rights risks 
creating fertile ground for further conflicts and instability in the future.  
Russia’s diplomacy around conflicts and its mediation initiatives pose a challenge to 
Western countries, many of which have become complacent about the importance of active 
diplomacy in support of conflict resolution. Russia’s model of top-down illiberal peace poses an 
ideological challenge to ideas of liberal conflict resolution and peacebuilding that the UN and 
Western states need to address. Russia’s initiatives gain traction in places where existing 
international approaches have been tried and failed. Russian initiatives should galvanize other 
parties to become more active in finding new approaches to peace negotiations and to act more 
effectively to end civil wars and deadly conflict. 
                                                 
21 V. Putin, “Vystuplenie i diskussiya na Myunkhenskoi konferentsii po voprosam politiki bezopasnosti,” Munich, 
February 10, 2007, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034. 
22 V. Manoilo, “Роль стратегии управляемого хаоса в формировании нового миропорядка” [The role of the 
strategy of managed chaos in the formation of a new world order], Право и политика, 5, (2014): 638-51.  
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